In this paper we study the sequential strategic interactive setting of bilateral, two-stage, seller-offers bargaining under uncertainty. We model the epistemology of the problem in a finite interactive decision-theoretic framework and solve it for three types of agents of successively increasing (epistemological) sophistication (i.e. capacity to represent and reason with higher orders of beliefs). We relax typical common knowledge assumptions, which, if made, would be sufficient to imply the existence of a, possibly unique, game-theoretic equilibrium solution. We observe and characterize a systematic monotonic relationship between an agent's beliefs and optimal behavior under a particular moment-based ordering of its beliefs. Based on this characterization, we present the spread-accumulate technique of sampling an agent's higher order belief by generating "evenly dispersed" beliefs for which we (pre)compute offline solutions. Higher order prior belief identification is then approximated to arbitrary precision by identifying a (previously solved) belief "closest" to the true belief. These methods immediately suggest a mechanism for achieving a balance between efficiency and the quality of the approximation -either by generating a large number of offline solutions or by allowing the agent to search online for a "closer" belief in the vicinity of best current solution.
INTRODUCTION
The central challenge that arises in the epistemological deliberations in strategic multi agent interactions under uncertainty, is representing and reasoning with the infinite interactive epistemology -first referred to in game-theoretic literature as "the infinite regress in reciprocal expectations" (Harsanyi, 1968) .
Beginning with Harsanyi's seminal work on Games under Incomplete Information (Harsanyi, 1968) , there is a long tradition of work and literature that has attempted to combine the game-theoretic notion of an equilibrium solution (Nash, 1950) , (Nash, 1951) with a formal (probabilistic) calculus for representing and reasoning with the players' (individual, mutual or common) knowledge or, lack thereof. The solution concepts that have been proposed throughout the history of this research effort involve, (see first (Selten, 1975) , then esp. (Fudenberg and Levine, 1981) and (Kreps and Wilson, 1982) ), the proposal of a profile of strategies and contingent beliefs for each agent such that, given its beliefs, no agent has the incentive to deviate unilaterally. Further, the agents' beliefs about the objects of uncertainty (for e.g. the path of play, incl. esp. the previous choices of the other agents) have to be consistent with (i.e plausible) with respect to the joint profile of strategies.
No attempt will be made here to survey the field. It suffices to simply point out that usefulness (or, applicability) of game-theoretic solution concepts as a control paradigm in strategic multi agent interactions is unclear, regardless of their mathematical and abstract elegance and, oftentimes, powerful explanatory power. This is primarily due to the fact that there may be a multiplicity of equilibria for a particular game; although, there is a vast literature (see, for e.g., (Kreps, 1985) , (Banks and Sobel, 1987) , (Cho, 1987) and (Cho and Kreps, 1987) ) discussing how one may refine the set of equilibria and select among them. Game-theoretic solution concepts have also been challenged on the basis of the fact that the common knowledge prerequisite (Aumann and Brandenburger, 1995) required to arrive at an equilibrium solutions may be unattainable.
Increasingly, (Bayesian) decision-theoretic and utility-theoretic approaches are becoming the dominant and normative paradigm for reasoning and decision making in settings under uncertainty. Recent promising work extends this paradigm to interactive (i.e. multi agent) settings , . In these models, the recursive modeling of other agents' beliefs and reasoning is made explicit in a framework called the I-POMDP that extends classical POMDPs. Computable (i.e. finitely nested) instances of these models simply stop the recursive reflection after finite levels, allowing agents to make the best-possible decision with the information they chose to represent. In essence, they are (expected utility maximizing) decision-theoretic models that represent and reason with finite levels of the interactive belief hierarchy and make no (common knowledge) assumptions regarding the levels that are not modeled.
This finite interactive decision theoretic model is the assumed modeling framework throughout the current work, where we study a particular interactive sequential game -namely, two-stage seller-offers bargaining under incomplete information (Samuelson, 1984) . It is known that this game has a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (Sobel and Takahashi, 1983) , if it is asummed that the seller's belief about the buyer's valuation is commonly known.
In this work, we do not make the assumption that the seller's (first-order) belief is commonly known. Instead, we cast the problem in the finite interactive decision theoretic framework for which we derive optimal strategies for three types of agents of successively increasing epistemological sophistication.
Our first main contribution is the observation of a systematic regular (monotonic) relationship between the epistemology of the problem and the agents' optimal behavior. Secondly, this regularity is exploited to devise a belief generation scheme that generates beliefs that are "evenly dispersed" across an entire space of beliefs -equivalent to sampling the higher order belief in "evenly dispersed" locations. And, thirdly, solutions to these sample beliefs are precomputed offline for later use in the online stage -which consists of a binary search through the space of solved beliefs to identify the closest sample belief in order to more accurately approximately predict future behavior of the opponent.
In the next section, we describe the model(s) used throughout this paper and introduce necessary notations. In the following three sections, we describe, respectively, the deliberative reasoning process for each of the three strategy levels. Our main contributions with respect to (higher order) belief sampling, identification and updating are presented in the context of the discussion about the most sophisticated agent type studies in this paper -the L3-Buyer (Section 5). In the final section, we summarize our contributions, state ongoing work and discuss relevant open questions.
PRELIMINARIES
Throughout this paper, it is assumed that the seller's valuation c = 0 and that the buyer's valuation v is such that 0 ≤ v ≤ 1. These are assumed to be commonly known; the exact value of v is the buyer's private information. The seller's belief about the buyer's valuation has the distribution F(v) = v; 0 ≤ v ≤ 1. We assume also that trade is feasible, i.e. that c ≤ v. The mechanism is simple -the seller makes a first offer x 1 which the buyer may chose to accept; if the buyer rejects it, the seller makes a second and final offer x 2 . The buyer strategic decision consists of choosing a decision boundary d(x 1 ) -it accepts the first offer
If agreement is arrived at on the first day, the payoffs are x 1 and v − x 1 to the seller and buyer, respectively. If agreement is arrived at on the second day, the payoffs are δ·x 2 and δ·(v−x 2 ), respectively. Else, the payoffs are 0 to either player. A discount factor, δ, is applied to the payoffs on the second day.
Agents may form other relevant beliefs and higher-order beliefs; for e.g. the seller may form a belief about the buyer's valuation, the buyer may form a second-order belief about the seller's first-order belief about its (i.e. the buyer's) valuation, etc. None of these beliefs are assumed to be commonly known.
Notations
The following notation will be used throughout. B X (p). Belief maintained by agent X (either seller S or buyer B) about p, where p is the object of the agent's belief and may be a ground proposition or another agent's belief about something (this will be clear from the context). (x) . The probability that offer x is accepted. p Reject (x) . The probability that offer x is rejected (equal to 1 − p Accept (x)). π 1 (·). The expected utility function for the entire (2-stage) sequential bargaining game. We denote arg max π 1 (·) by Π 1 (·). π 2 (·). The expected utility function for the last (i.e. second) stage of the bargaining game. We denote arg max π 2 (·) by Π 2 (·). The influence of an agent's belief on its objective function is indicated by appending the belief as a superscript to the expected utility function as well as to the probabilities of an offer being accepted or rejected.
U(s)
.
The Epistemic Setup
Using the notations introduced above, we now define the three types of successively more sophisticated agents that are studied in this paper along with the interactive epistemology that arises due to interactions between these agents. Please see Figure 1 for a graphical illustration of the same.
L1-Buyer believes that the seller's first offer x 1 is uniformly selected from (0, 1) and that its second offer is uniformly distributed between 0 (the lowest possible) and the first offer, i.e. B B (x 2 ) ∼ U(0, x 1 ); in other words, that the seller's second offer is some arbitrary amount lesser than the first.
L2-Seller believes that the buyer's belief about x 2 given x 1 is that it is supported on (0, x 1 ) -although, the seller does not "know" that this belief is uniformly distributed. Therefore, it maintains a higher (second) order belief that is supported on some subset of all possible beliefs about x 2 given x 1 that are supported on (0, 
L3-Buyer
The buyer believes that the seller's belief about E B [x 2 |x 1 ] is supported on (0, x 1 ) -although, the buyer does not "know" that this belief is uniformly distributed; in other words, the buyer does not "know" that the seller is uniformly uncertain about the buyer's belief about x 2 given x 1 . Therefore, this buyer maintains a higher order belief that is supported on some subset of all possible beliefs that the seller may maintain about E B [x 2 |x 1 ].
L1-BUYER
The L1-Buyer accepts the first offer x 1 if the imemdiate profit is not lesser than the expected profit from the next turn, i.e. if
L2-SELLER
Note that the L1-Buyer believes that the second offer x 2 is selected from some distribution in ∆(0, x 1 ) -namely, the space of all distributions supported on (0, x 1 ). Therefore, given x 1 , it can calculate the expected value of the second offer E B [x 2 |x 1 ] -which is all it needs to compute the optimal decison boundary. For e.g., if the L1-Buyer believes that x 2 ∼ U(0, x 1 ) (as is actually the case as shown in the previous sec-
its beliefs about E B [x 2 |x 1 ] -matter when it reasons about the buyer's reasoning process following the rejection of the first offer. In the epistemics considered here (see Figure 1 ), the seller believes that
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The influence of the seller's belief about E B [x 2 |x 1 ] on the values of the obective function at each stage and on the probabilities of acceptance is indicated by including the belief as the superscript of such values.
Uniform Belief with Finite Support
We now focus our attention on a specific epistemic setup to fix intuition. Assume that
The purpose of this setup is two-fold -first, it may be seen as a simplified approximate version of the seller's actual belief and, second, it may also be thought of as a means of gaining useful insight into the epistemic deliberative and computational challenges inherent in the original problem. 
If a particular offer x 1 is rejected, the resultant posterior density from the seller's belief update is a weighted sum of three densities, represented pictorially as:
The probability that x 1 will be accepted can be expressed as:
Now, the the seller assigns the following probability to the buyer accepting the second offer:
Accordingly, the seller's second stage objective function (i.e. expected profit from offering some x 2 after x 1 has been rejected) becomes:
and
respectively.
We first obtain both of these as functions of x 1 from the piecewise first-order conditions for π 2 (x 2 ). Then, we express the seller's main (first stage) objective function as:
The first-order conditions for π 1 (x 1 ) provide us the seller's optimal first offer X 1 as 0.3831693366 (from which we can easily compute the the optimal second offer X 2 and the expected optimal profit Π 1 ).
The algorithm for the general case (for evenly distributed uniform discretized beliefs of finite support) is provided by Procedure X1X2Pi1.
Procedure: X1X2Pi1(N,δ,p).
Input: N ← the number of samples, δ ← the discount factor and p ← an array (of size N) of probabilities
// Given the number of samples, the discount factor and a prior belief sampling, returns the seller's optimal offer schedule and expected optimal profit for the case where
objective function
end We now highlight a few insights gained: 1. The optimal offers and optimal expected profits for the cases when each of the sample points considered here is the certain case (i.e. w.p. 1), is shown in Table 1 . Table 2 . As we increase the support of the seller's belief (i.e. as N grows), we observe a Cauchylike behavior in the corresponding optimal (first) offers. In ongoing work, we are attempting to establish whether these values do indeed converge (as they seem to) and whether they converge to x U(0,x 1 ), * 1 (as hoped for). In the simplest case, the L3-Buyer "knows" B S (p) with certainty. In this case, it can solve the seller's optimization problem (for e.g., just like the seller does, through sampling) to form expectations about x 2 which, in turn, it uses to compute d * .
L3-BUYER
In the general case, the buyer needs a method whereby it can use the seller's first offer as an informative signal to update B B B S (p) -i.e. to compute B B B S (p|x 1 ). The buyer deems a particular seller belief implausible if a seller with such a belief would have never sent the recieved (i.e. actual) first offer. This constitutes the central contribution of the current work and is discussed in detail next.
Higher Order Belief Identification
and Refinement (Update) Figure 2 represents the mapping from the seller's belief to the objective function to the optimal (first) offfer. The L3-Buyer is interested in the inverses of these mappings in order to refine the support of its belief about the seller's belief. The L2-Seller's objective function is parametrized by its belief about E B [x 2 |x 1 ] -which it expresses as a belief about p (recall that E B [x 2 |x 1 ] = p · x 1 ). It obtains the appropriate form of the objective function by computing its expected value, i.e. by integrating over its belief about p (see Figure 2) . Let B p be the class of all possible beliefs about p.
The seller's objective function π is characterized by parameter p (and, henceforth, will be written as π p ).
Let D p,π p be the class of all objective functions generated by integrating π over p for all possible beliefs about p (i.e., over all elements of B p ). The seller obtains the optimal (first) offer from the first-order conditions for the objective function.
In general, it is true that there are an uncountable number of functions that share the same argmax in a given interval. But, for the buyer, the relevant question is Question 1. Is the mapping from the seller's possible objective functions, D p,π , to the optimal offers, X * p,π p , injective? A related and important question is Question 2. Is the mapping from the seller's beliefs to objective functions injective? Note that the buyer's update process consists of contingent-factual reasoning which may involve inverting the two discussed mappings (Figure 2 ). Such inversions necessitate that the maps be injective.
Unfortunately, these maps are not injective; an observation which can be established by a few examples. So, then, how does the buyer update its belief?
It is in the context of this problem that we present the main contribution of this paper. Our approach involves looking at the buyer's belief update problem in the other (i.e. the forward) direction -i.e. from the seller' beliefs to its actions. Establishing that the optimal offers (schedules) are monotonic w.r.t. some suitable ordering of the seller's beliefs would point to a means of identifying the seller's next offer (with arbitrary precision) by searching for a close-enough belief that would explain the seller's first offer. We now proceed to expound this idea in depth. 
(µ,
Since the buyer does not, in general, know F, we assume that the distribution function of p comes from a family of distribution functions F p . Here, we define a particular ordering for classes of distributions.
Order (µ,σ) (F ) . Given a class of distribution functions F , Order (µ,σ) (F ) is a (total) ordering of F based on the expectation (i.e. mean value) of the member distributions, where, if possible, ties are broken by further (totally) ordering based on the variance of the member distributions. In symbols,
Now consider a sequence of distribution functions
addition to satisfying an additional technical requirement that the F n are "not too close". We obtain empirical evidence that indicates that, under such an ordering, the distribution functions F n have a monotonic influence on the saddle-point of E F n (π p ), i.e.:
This seems to be the case because of the fact that p exerts a monotonic influence on argmax π p (see Table 1 ). Clearly, this observation is specific to the problem and the mechanism under consideration and it is not immediate whether it is true in general. The statement and proof of a general result of this type is a subject of current work.
In any case, the empirically established monotonic behavior observed in the current settings provides sufficient grounds for the development of the higher order belief identification method that is outlined in the next subsection.
(µ, σ)-ordered Spread-Accumulate Sample Generation Method for Higher Order Belief Sampling
Based on the observations of the previous section, the buyer can pre-compute the seller's optimal first offer for various seller belief settings 1 that are "appropriately evenly dispersed" according to the (µ, σ)-ordering. Then, when it recieves a particular first offer from the seller, it can first find the nearest precomputed belief setting that explains this offer and, 1 For convenience, we only consider discrete beliefs if necessary, search in the (µ, σ)-vicinity of this belief for a "better explanation". First, we need a systematic method of sampling to choose and solve for a set of beliefs that are "appropriately evenly dispersed" across the entire space of possible beliefs (in the buyer's support). At the least, the method has to select a set of distributions with mean values that range from one extreme end of the support interval to the other. Further, for a particular mean, it has to select distributions with a range of variances -from low to medium to high.
We have devised exactly such a method -and we call it the spread-accumulate sample generation method. It consists of the following steps: 1. Discretize the support of the seller's belief (about p) uniformly into N intervals. Here p ∈ (0, 1]; therefore, the discretized beliefs will be supported on ), for different settings of the variance (from low to high). Two distinct kinds of cases can be identified: Extreme points (2 cases). The entire mass of the distribution (= 1) is concentrated on one of the extreme points of the supporing set. The variance setting cannot be changed (i.e. decreased) any further without shifting the mean. Interior points ((N − 3)(N − 1) cases). For a particular mean, we first choose and solve for the discrete belief which concentrates all its mass on the mean value. Then, this being the key step of the spread-accumulate method, we select distributions by alternatively successively spreading out the probability mass from the previous distributions to neighbouring points and then accumulating some probability mass from the interior points to the most extreme points with positive mass. An example will illuminate: Let N = 7. Let the desired mean be 4 7 . Then, the spread-accumulate method generates discrete distributions on the support 1 7 , 2 7 , ..., stores the corresponding optimal schedules (the first and second offers) in 2D arrays. The whole process -spread-accumulate sample generation and optimal schedule computation -is described in Procedure L3BuyerOfflineX1X2Pi1. Row i corresponds to beliefs with mean= i N . The column entries correspond to different settings of the variance -from low (entry 1) to high (entry n − 1).
Online Computation of d *
The offline pre-computation of the seller's optimal schedule for various seller belief settings, described in the previous section, enables the buyer to identify the "closest" belief in the (µ, σ)-ordering to the seller's actual belief (this is exactly the belief that is associated with the optimal first offer closest to the seller's actual first offer). In the offline step, the buyer stores results into the 2D array in the naturally available monotonic ordering -this is exploited here to implement the buyer's closest-belief-identification procedure as a binary search. The buyer can then also, optionally, perform a refined search (through further sampling and computation) in this vicinity to identify a "closer" belief. Once the buyer finds a "close enough" solution (to arbitrary precision), it uses the associated optimal second offer to compute d * . This process is formally outlined in Procedure L3BuyerGetX1RetD*.
An Example
We consider the case of an L2Seller, Sam bargaining with an L3Buyer, Bob. (We also assume that δ = 0.6 throughout this example). Sam models the buyer as an L1-type buyer (cf. Section ) and has the following belief about the buyer's expectation of the second offer given the first:
where p is supported on [2/5, 4/5] with respective probabilites [2/3, 1/3]. This may be interpreted as Sam's belief that Bob is twice as likely to expect a huge decrease in the second offer, corresponding to P B S (E B [x 2 |x 1 ]) (p = 2/5) = 2/3, than not. Sam's problem may be solved to obtain the optimal offers as: x1 * Sam = 0.39 and x2 * Sam = 0.32 Now, we consider Bob's offline step. Say that Bob chooses discretization paramater, N, to be 6. Bob's solution for all the 17 (= 2 + (N − 3)(N − 1)) sampled belief points are recorded in Table 3 where each entry (i, j) is a 2-tuple (X1 [i, j] , X2 [i, j] ), such that X1 [i, j] and X2 [i, j] comprise the solution corresponding to the belief sample with mean i N and variance corresponding to the j th smallest for that particular mean value (generated according to spreadaccumulate sampling).
Procedure: L3BuyerOfflineX1X2Pi1(N,δ).
Input: N ← the number of discretization intervals and δ ← the discount factor Output: X 1 , X 2 and Π 1 ← (N − 1) × (N − 1) 2D arrays representing, respectively, the optimal schedule and optimal expected profit to the seller for different settings of seller beliefs // Procedure X1X2Pi1 will be invoked throughout begin // a ← a size (N − 1) probability vector a ← {1, 0, ..., Input: x1 ← the (L2-type) seller's first offer, N ← the dimension of the precomputed 2D arrays, X1 and X2 and δ ← the discount factor Output: s * ← the (L3-type) buyer's decision boundary // The set of beliefs with the closest mean value if first identified using binary search; then, the belief with the closest variance is identified using linear search through this class
Procedure L3BuyerGetX1RetD*'s trace with respect to Table 3 shows that, after three binary search steps and five linear search steps, the "closest" precomputed first offer given the actual value of 0.39 is 0.3874, corresponding to X1 [3, 1] . The corresponding best estimate of the second offer, X2 [3, 1] , is 0.3389, which is very close to the actual second offer, 0.32. The cutoff that is computed is
while the optimal cutoff is x1 − δ · x2 
CONTRIBUTIONS AND ONGOING WORK
In the course of analyzing the L2-Seller (cf. Section 4), we graphically illustrated the step-function shape of a (Bayesian) updated belief density for an agent that maintains a discrete uniform prior belief and uses the opponent's signal as a screening device. In ongoing work, we are working on a generalized belief update method for computing posterior densities using a screening signal for general (i.e. non-uniform) discrete prior beliefs. In addition, we are investigating whether the optimal strategies of the L2-Seller converge when we increase the number of samples used to represent its discrete uniform prior belief. In Section 5, we analyzed the L3-Buyer and presented the central contributions of this paper. We made an important observation about the regular (monotonic) influence of a particular ordering, namely, the (µ, σ)-ordering, of distribution functions of a random variable on the (maximal) saddle-point of an objective function that is paramatrized by that variable. In this context, we presented a question that will be the subject of future work: Does the observed regular (monotonic) Next, we motivated and developed the spreadaccumulate (belief) sample generation method. This method enables the generation of "evenly dispersed" samples from the higher order belief space. These samples are then pre-solved offline to facilitate online binary-search for the "closest" belief instead of doing exact belief update (which may be analyticaly unachievable and numerically intractable). In this manner, we are able to realize (approximate) higherorder belief update. The monotonicity property of the (µ, σ)-ordering is exploited to implement the binary search through the space of (sampled and pre-solved) beliefs to identify the closest representative.
We then proposed that this higher-order belief update (or, approximate identification) scheme may be seen as an online-refinement based realization of bounded rationality. If the precomputed solutions are not "close enough" (within some desired precision), the agent can perform further online computations and fine-grained search within the (µ, σ)-vicinity of the current best solution. The agent can increase the quality of its offline solutions during its down-time as well as seek a better approximations online.
Conclusions
In conclusion, we have demonstrated the usefulness and epistemological modeling power of the framework of multi-agent decision-theoretic reasoning and sequential planning with finite interactive epistemolgies for the realworld problem of bilateral bargaining. We focussed on the problem of higher-order belief update in this context and presented some regularity results that connected beliefs (epistemology) and behavior (optimal strategies). Based on this, we developed a novel evenly-dispersed higher order belief sample generation scheme (the spread-accumulate method) for approximating higher-order belief identification in order to (approximately) realize higher-order belief update.
Our methods are potentially generalizable to other problem domains that involve strategic multiagent interactions -all that needs to be done is to check whether the epistemology-optimal behaviour regularity phenomenon holds for a given problem. A complete characterization of general epistemological and strategic conditions under which this phenomenon arises is crucial for advancing the finite epistemological decision-theoretic framework and for completing the theory of intelligent and autonomous behavior in multiagent settings.
